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Abstract 
 
Although the interest about emergence has grown during the last years, there 
does not seem to be consensus on whether it is a non-trivial, interesting notion 
and whether the concept of reduction is relevant to its characterization. 
Another key issue is whether emergence should be understood as an epistemic 
notion or if there is a plausible ontological concept of emergence. The aim of 
this work is to propose an epistemic notion of contextual emergence on the 
basis of which one may tackle those issues. 
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2 
1 Background 
 
According to a classic notion, emergent properties are properties of a system 
that depend on, but are irreducible to the system’s constituent elements (cf. 
Kim, 1999; 2006). Charles Dunbar Broad (1925), one of the British 
emergentists, characterized emergent properties in a way that can be 
formulated as follows (Beckermann, 1992, p. 17):  
 
1.1 Emergent property. A property F of a system S, made up of the 
constituents C1, …, Cn standing in a certain relation R to each other, is 
emergent if and only if (a) there is a law to the effect that all systems with 
the same make-up have F, and (b) F nonetheless cannot, even in theory, 
be deduced from the most complete knowledge of the properties of the 
components C1, …, Cn in isolation or in systems with a different make-up.  
 
Condition (a) states that there must be a dependence between an emergent 
property and the constituents of the system in which it arises. Emergent 
properties occur in all systems in which certain kinds of components are 
organized in a certain way. They depend on those kinds of components and 
on their organization. The latter is crucial, as condition (b) establishes. One 
cannot deduce the instantiation of an emergent property without considering 
the particular organization on which it depends. Thus, emergent properties 
are irreducible in this sense.  
One could define emergence in terms of this classical notion, 
understanding it as the process in which emergent properties are formed in a 
system. Although this definition seems plausible, it is not very informative if 
we are interested in the diachronic aspect of emergence, that is, in the arising 
of emergent properties. Even if emergence can be related to irreducibility and 
complexity, it is not clear how we should understand it as a relation1, i.e. how 
we should understand the fact that some properties appear from the 
interactions of a system’s constituents.  
Recent accounts usually associate emergence with the complexity of a 
system, i.e. with how numerous its parts and their interactions are (cf. 
Holland, 2014). Thus, emergent properties are properties that arise in a system 
when the system’s complexity increases considerably (cf. El-Hani & Pereira, 
2000; Fuentes, 2014). Understanding emergence in terms of the increase of 
complexity may account for the procedural, non-static aspect of this relation. 
But complexity alone does not seem to express the fact that emergent 
properties are determined by and irreducible to the system’s constituents. 
Considering certain notions of reduction, such as identity and functional 
reduction, the irreducibility of emergent states implies that their causal 
                                                 
1 I will assume that emergence is a general relation. This does not mean that there is 
only one kind of emergence. As shown, different notions of emergence can be derived 
from a broad one. Also, such a general notion will be defined as a set of relations. 
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efficacy is beyond the causal efficacy of the constituents underlying the 
system in which they arise. If emergent states were strictly identical to some 
set constituents, their causal powers would also be identical to the causal 
powers of the constituents. The same holds for functional reduction, since a 
state A is functionally reduced to a state B just in case A plays the same causal 
role as B. Thus, the irreducibility of emergent states could allow us to accept 
that they may cause states that their constituent parts can’t. They could be 
considered as causes of other emergent states, as in cases where an ecological 
state causes other ecological states (horizontal causation). And even more 
interestingly, they could be causes of lower-level states, such as when 
ecological states influence the behavior of an ecosystem’s members. These 
are cases of downward causation.  
 But downward causation is not unproblematic. Consider this version of 
the well-known exclusion argument, which can be applied against it (cf. Kim, 
2005, p. 19): Let us assume that any event that has a cause, has a sufficient 
physical cause, and that sufficient physical causes exclude other kinds of 
causes. Assume further that there are no genuine cases of overdetermination, 
i.e. if an event has a sufficient cause c, then no event distinct from c can also 
be considered a cause of that event. Now, if any macroscopic, emergent state 
e is able to cause another macroscopic state e', it must also be able to influence 
the microscopic, physical basis of e'. That is, downward causation should be 
possible. But this contradicts the first two assumptions: Since the physical 
basis of e' has, as assumed, a sufficient physical cause, the causal capacity of 
e must be excluded from the picture. Therefore, downward causation does not 
seem to be possible. 
Mark Bedau (1997) distinguishes weak emergence from strong emergence 
in order to tackle the problem of the causal efficacy of emergent states. 
According to his account, an emergent state is weakly emergent just in case 
its description can be derived from descriptions of microstates, but only by 
simulation. Roughly, a simulation is a representation of iterating, causal 
interactions between the micro elements of a system. On this basis, certain 
configurations observed in simulation processes can be considered as 
emergent states and have causal powers that are distinct from the causal 
powers of the microstates underlying them. Strong emergent states, by 
contrast, are the ones that are not reducible at all. The question is, following 
this distinction, “What can we call a strongly emergent property”? According 
to David Chalmers (2006), consciousness is a clear example of a strongly 
emergent state. A state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that 
state. 
Also contrasting with the traditionally assumed irreducibility of emergent 
states, Jeremy Butterfield (2011) shows that emergence and reduction are 
compatible, even if we assume a strong notion of reduction, such as Nagelian 
reduction (Nagel, 1961). Butterfield understands emergence as novel and 
robust behavior and, according to his account, whether a given emergent 
behavior can be reduced depends on the values of certain parameters, such as 
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a system’s degrees freedom or the number of iterations associated with the 
system in some definitional process. 
Not everyone thinks that the notion of reduction is necessary for 
characterizing emergence. Karen Crowther (2015) tackles the topic focusing 
on the philosophy of physics and argues, on the basis of effective field theory, 
that the notion of reduction is irrelevant for defining emergence. According 
to effective field theory, physical theories are hierarchically ordered 
depending on energy scale. On this basis, emergent behavior is understood as 
novel and autonomous behavior. Roughly, according to Crowther, novelty 
expresses that the relevant interactions involved in high-level theories are not 
present in low-level theories, while autonomy (actually, quasi-autonomy) 
means that high-level theories are independent of low-level details2. 
So, traditionally, the notion of reduction has been relevant for the 
understanding of emergence and even if not every analysis of emergence is 
based on reduction in some way or another, the most crucial issues regarding 
emergent states are related to their presumed irreducibility. Considering the 
perspectives just reviewed, we may ask six crucial questions that any clear 
account on emergence should tackle:  
 
a) How are emergent states dependent and, at the same time, irreducible to 
a system’s constituents?  
b) What is the role of complexity with regard to emergence?  
c) How is downward causation possible? 
d) In which sense are states of consciousness emergent? 
e) Is reduction compatible with emergence?  
f) Is the notion of reduction even relevant for characterizing emergence? 
 
These questions will not be answered by giving an analysis of each one of the 
topics they represent, but they will guide the main discussions of the 
following sections. 
 
 
2 Contextual Emergence and the consistency challenge 
 
Some of the issues mentioned in the previous section are part of what Olivier 
Sartenaer (2016) calls the consistency challenge. This problem can be stated 
as follows:  
 
2.1 The consistency challenge. It is difficult to understand how emergent 
states are determined by the constituents of a given system and are, at the 
                                                 
2 While the accounts of Crowther and Butterfield are focused on physical emergence, I 
am concerned here with the notion of emergence in its general sense and with how it 
may be applied in a diverse class of cases. Of course, it is crucial to study in which 
particular cases or fields is reduction relevant and in which cases not, but I will not 
pursue this task here. 
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same time, unexplainable, autonomous and irreducible. 
 
This is a serious issue and must be considered if we want to explain in which 
sense emergent states are irreducible and explanatorily relevant. In what 
follows, I will propose a definition of the notion of emergence that not only 
may tackle the consistency challenge, but is actually directly motivated by it. 
According to the proposal, emergent states are reducible and irreducible at 
the same time. And they must be so. Of course, this rough characterization is 
a clear contradiction and has to be reformulated in order to be included in a 
coherent account. 
An appropriate way to dissolve apparent inconsistencies is to consider 
from different perspectives the different propositions that seem to be mutually 
inconsistent. Such perspectives can be called contexts.  
Let a context be a set containing descriptive, normative and phenomenal 
information, which determines, in the form of a background, the truth value 
or correctness of certain propositions. Thus, contexts may include norms, 
interests, laws, descriptions and non-descriptive expressions about 
experiences3. Here is an example that may illustrate the role played by a 
context. The proposition “The fact that Susan took a child’s surfboard without 
permission was wrong” seems to be true, given commonly accepted moral 
norms. These moral norms are part of a context that determines the truth-
value of the considered proposition. Now, suppose that we learn that Susan 
took the surfboard to save a drowning person. Adding this new information 
to the context and considering the value of saving a life, the proposition seems 
to be false. One of my aims will be to show that, regarding emergence, 
propositions about reducibility can be plausibly understood as context-
dependent in a similar way and that this will be helpful to answer the 
consistency challenge. Before showing how this can be done, let us focus on 
further aspects of the notion of a context assumed here. 
Contexts can be ordered by a relation of aboutness. A context K is of a 
higher level than a context K' if K involves information about expressions that 
are part of K' but K' does not involve information about K4. For instance, a 
context focused on organizing board games may involve information about a 
context focused on chess, but the latter would probably not involve 
                                                 
3 Although it is associated with semantic aspects, this is not exactly the semantic notion 
of context, which is usually understood as a set of parameters. John Perry (2001) makes 
a distinction between two types of semantic contexts. Narrow contexts include only a 
speaker, a place and a time. Wide contexts may include additional parameters, such as 
intentions and sets of conditions. The notion of context characterized in this work 
corresponds to the one of a wide context. However, it is not only associated with 
semantic and pragmatic features, but also with scientific, theoretic and perceptual ones. 
4  Contexts may contain linguistic expressions that can be interpreted from the 
perspective of other contexts. Thus, they also involve information or propositions. 
Although the information contained in a context can be fixed within the context itself, 
we do not have to focus always on those internal interpretations.  
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information about the former 5 . In this sense, the context focused on 
organizing games is informationally higher in the hierarchy or is more general 
than the context focused on chess. We may say then that the second context 
is accessible from the first, calling the former a subcontext. Contexts also have 
an internal relevance structure on the basis of which their information is 
ordered and can be distinguished accordingly. Let descriptive contexts be 
contexts in which descriptions are especially relevant, normative contexts be 
contexts that are mainly about norms and observational contexts be contexts 
that are mainly focused on observations. Different kinds of contexts may be 
interrelated in different ways. For instance, an observational context may be 
supported by some descriptive context that provides explanations for some 
observations or it may be guided by some normative context that indicates 
what to observe or what to avoid doing while observing something. 
Wth this general idea of a context we can define emergence—in particular, 
the notion of an emergent state—as follows: 
 
2.2 Contextual emergence. From the perspective of context K, a set of 
states E is emergent from a set of states B just in case there are three 
contexts, K1, K2 and K3, accessible from K, such that the following 
conditions are met. 
2.2.1 According to K1, E is reducible to B. 
2.2.2 According to K2, E is irreducible to B. 
2.2.3 According to K3, E involves novel properties with regard to the 
properties found in B, which are correlated with an abrupt change of 
complexity of B, according to K. 
 
This definition is focused on emergence as a relation and on the notion of an 
emergent state6, but it does not say anything explicitly about the notions of 
emergent phenomenon and emergent property, which are common within the 
literature about this topic. These can be seen as derivative notions based on 
the definition just given: 
 
2.3 Emergent phenomenon. Let E be an emergent state according to some 
context K and Ko an observational context, accessible from K, in which 
the novel properties of E are observed. The phenomenon corresponding to 
                                                 
5  Of course, information about chess will contain information about board games, 
because chess is a board game. But it does not have to contain information about how 
to organize board games. 
6 In general, I will neither assume distinctions between states and descriptions of states 
nor between properties and predicates. Since the notion of context considered here is 
fundamentally theoretical, to say something about a state, from the perspective of a 
context, usually means to say something about a description and to say something about 
a property, according to a context, means to say something about a predicate. This 
assumption holds unless I focus explicitly on non-descriptive items, such as 
phenomenal or normative states. 
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that observation is an emergent phenomenon, according to K. 
 
2.4 Emergent property. Let E be an emergent state according to some 
context K and K' a context, accessible from K, that involves the novel 
properties of E. In K, these are emergent properties. 
 
Condition 2.2.1 indicates reducibility, i.e. that reduction should only be 
possible, not that it must be achieved. Thus, for instance, we may consider an 
emerging flock of birds as reducible to the states and motions of the singular 
birds that constitute the group, even if we are not actually reducing the 
emerging behavior in that context. Contextual emergence must not be 
constrained to any notion of reduction in particular, although functional 
reduction is especially relevant because it allows us to tackle the problem 
regarding the causal efficacy of emergent states. As mentioned before, 
functional reduction can be characterized in the following way: 
 
2.5 Functional reduction. A state E is functionally reduced to another state 
B if and only if these conditions are satisfied: 
2.5.1 Any state that causes E also causes B. 
2.5.2 Any state that is caused by E is also caused by B. 
 
In other words, a state is functionally reduced to another when the causal 
profile of the first is included in the causal profile of the second (cf. 
Shoemaker, 2007). Note that functional reduction does not imply that one of 
the states is more fundamental than the other. It is not an antisymmetric 
relation; it is possible that A is reducible to B and that B is reducible to A. Of 
course, it may be that E is reduced to B when B is more fundamental. And the 
manifestation of this would be that some states that are causes or effects of B 
are not part of the causal profile of E.  
I will assume that, for functional reduction, any instantiation of a property 
(such as events, states or facts) can be taken as a relatum of the causal relation 
and any notion of causation based on difference-making (cf. Ney 2009) is 
applicable to the account of emergence proposed here. A physicalist notion 
of causation may also be appropriate. Take, for instance, Phil Dowe’s (2000) 
account of physical causation, according to which, two events are causally 
related if they are connected by the transmission of some conserved quantity. 
It is not problematic to accept that interactions occurring between constituents 
of a system may interact causally in this sense. However, there is the 
challenge of describing the higher-level states of the system in those terms.  
Consider, for example, drought periods, which can be seen as states of an 
ecosystem that arise from different interactions between the system’s 
members and other conditions. These could be described involving quantities 
such as temperature and humidity. A first issue regarding functional reduction 
on the basis of physical causation consists in the fact that, in order to treat 
those quantities as conserved quantities, one must assume that there is some 
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closed system in which they are assigned. Clearly, this cannot be the 
ecosystem to which we attribute the drought in the first place. If that 
assumption is not made, a broader system must be chosen for the purposes of 
reduction. This issue should not be a problem for difference-making accounts 
of causation. If both the drought and B, a given low-level state of the system, 
make differences in some other state and if some previous state influences 
both, the drought and B, then they share a causal profile. In this sense, the 
drought is reducible to the low-level state regardless of whether the kinds of 
properties involved in the description of the latter are strictly physical or not. 
A second issue would consist in expressing the effects of the drought 
period, such as the migration of some species, in terms of conserved 
quantities. This could be done by constructing a statistical model of the 
species’ population and treating each individual as a unit of the quantity that 
measures that species’ population. This issue is neither a problem for 
difference-making accounts of causation. One may assume a single 
description for the migration and determine that both the drought as a high-
level process and the corresponding low-level state make differences on the 
migration process. It is possible, however, that both do not produce the same 
amount of difference in the considered effect. Anyway, ceteris paribus, if the 
drought had not occurred, the migration would not have occurred. Now, a 
description of the low-level state corresponding to the drought must be more 
specific than a description of the drought. This means that low-level 
variations may have implied specific variations in the migration process, like 
its duration, but not necessarily its non-occurrence. 
A third issue is the fact that, after producing a physical characterization of 
the drought period, it is no longer plausible to say that the causal profile of 
the drought is included in the causal profile of its physical description. It is 
rather a case of methodological replacement of a state’s description. This is 
not a problem for difference-making accounts of causation, since the 
description of low-level states must neither be considered as a re-description 
of, nor as a replacement of the drought. 
Despite the difficulties just mentioned, I think that functional reduction is 
possible under appropriate assumptions, i.e. under appropriate contexts. Since 
contexts are here defined not only in terms of the descriptions they contain, 
but also on the basis of their normative aspects, the plausibility of functional 
reduction will depend on pragmatic and methodological assumptions. 
Let us now turn to condition 2.2.2. It establishes that emergent states are 
irreducible from the perspective of a certain relevant context, which is distinct 
from the reduction context. Irreducibility may hold because E cannot be 
functionally reduced to B, as when, for instance, we cannot reduce an 
economic crisis to the set of descriptions involving economic agents. An 
economic crisis may have effects on political decisions, but the latter can 
hardly be taken as effects of just low-level economic behavior. Irreducibility 
may also hold when B has not a suited interpretation, which can occur in the 
observation of a figure constituted by materials that are unknown to the 
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observer. 
As in the case of reduction, whether a state is irreducible will not only 
depend on the descriptive aspects of a given context, but also on its normative 
aspects, usually associated with the aims of inquiry and with interests of 
different sorts.  
It should be simple now to understand in which sense the contextualist 
strategy proposed here allows us to tackle the consistency challenge. How can 
emergent states be determined by the constituents of the system in which they 
arise and, at the same time, be irreducible to them? The key is to read “at the 
same time” as “at the same time, but in a different context”. Thus, emergent 
states are determined by the system’s constituents and, at the same time, but 
in a different context, irreducible to them. 
As noted earlier, the account of contextual emergence proposed here is not 
restricted to any notion of reduction in particular. A particular focus on 
functional reduction was made because it is understood in terms of causal 
roles, which is especially important if we want to tackle the problem of 
downward causation. Now, if there is any restriction that may be relevantly 
considered at this point, it is the one based on the distinction between 
ontological and representational, i.e. epistemological reduction (cf. van 
Gulick 2001). Here are four main notions of ontological reduction: 
 
2.6 Elimination. A state A is reduced to a state B just in case A is 
ontologically nothing but B, which implies that A can be replaced by B. 
 
2.7 Identity. A is reduced to B just in case A is identical with B.  
 
2.8 Composition. A is reduced to B just in case A is entirely composed 
by B.  
 
2.9 Supervenience. A is reduced to B just in case there cannot be 
differences regarding A without differences regarding B. 
 
According to Robert van Gulick (2001, p. 3), an ontological notion of 
reduction stands for a relation that links items in the world, as opposed to 
representational notions, which are about relations between representational 
items. Now, four important examples of representational reduction are the 
following:  
 
2.10 Replacement. A description (proposition or representational 
system) A is reduced to a description B just in case A is theoretically 
replaced by B. 
 
2.11 Derivation. A description A is reduced to a description B just in case 
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A can be derived from B, given the appropriate set of laws and conditions. 
 
2.13 Expressive equivalence. A description A is reduced to a description B 
just in case every fact that can be represented by A can also be represented 
by B. 
 
2.14 Teleo-pragmatic equivalence. A description A is reduced to a 
description B just in case every fact that can be represented by an agent S, 
using A within a social and physical context C, according to a theory T1, 
can also be represented by S, using B within C, according to T2. (cf. van 
Gulick 2001, p. 14) 
 
The proposal of reduction as teleo-pragmatic equivalence put forward by van 
Gulick is a contextualist one, like the account of emergence explored in the 
present work7. On this basis, teleo-pragmatic equivalence seems to be a suited 
notion to be included within a specification of the conditions for emergence. 
Assuming that theories are a kind of epistemic context, we would say that the 
description of a system’s emergent state represents, according to a certain 
context, the same state as the descriptions of the system’s constituents, but, 
according to another context, it does not. Again, this is how emergent states 
can be considered as reducible and, at the same time, irreducible to the parts 
of the system from which they arise. 
Of course, to think that reduction as teleo-pragmatic equivalence is 
particularly appropriate to support contextual emergence does not mean that 
other notions of epistemic reduction should be ignored. We could characterize 
a notion of emergence based on reduction as replacement, as well as a notion 
based on reduction as derivation. Both can be special cases of contextual 
emergence, if the characterizations involve the proposed conditions. The 
theoretical strength of each special case may vary depending on the notion of 
reduction that one assumes. Thus, emergence based on replacement would 
probably be a stronger and more demanding notion than emergence based on 
expressive equivalence. 
Furthermore, we can, in principle, include notions of ontological reduction 
in specifications of contextual emergence. All depends, in a certain sense, on 
our ideas about how independent ontology is from epistemology. This issue 
will be considered later, in section 5. 
Let us focus on condition 2.2.3. In order to grasp the main point expressed 
by it, we need to characterize the notion of novelty. This can be done as 
follows: 
 
2.15 Novelty. According to a context K, P is a novel property just in case, 
                                                 
7 A fundamental difference between both accounts is the fact that, according to the 
version of the teleo-pragmatic account here characterized, the context could (at least in 
principle) be referring to something objective, to facts of the world, while I treat 
contexts as epistemic items. 
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in K, there are two sets of states, F and G, such that F is considered before 
G and P is not involved in F but in G. 
 
This is a general notion of novelty. More specific are the notions of 
synchronic novelty and diachronic novelty. Cases in which F and G are 
simultaneous are cases of synchronic novelty and cases in which F and G 
occur at different times are cases of diachronic novelty8. Note the difference 
between saying that, according to K, F is considered before G and saying that, 
according to K, F occurs before G. Both kinds of novelty are crucial to 
understand emergence. Consider, for instance, the patterns formed by a flock 
of birds. These patterns emerge from the interactions between the birds, 
which are the constituent parts of the flock. On the one hand, synchronic 
novelty is a characteristic of the fact that the patterns and figures formed are 
properties of the flock as a system, not of its constituents. On the other hand, 
diachronic novelty is also present if we consider the different changes of the 
flock patterns that can be observed, including changes from states that do not 
involve any relevant formation at all. Observation is here broadly understood. 
One can observe patterns formed by a flock of birds or regularities in a data 
set.  
Complexity is also important in condition 2.2.3. I will only consider a 
general, comparative notion. Given two systems, s and s', if s involves a 
greater number of constituents, more types of constituents, a greater number 
of interactions and more types of interactions than s', then s is more complex 
than s'. Note that a high number of parts and interactions is not enough for 
complexity. A huge bunch of stuff may not be complex. But a big group of 
different entities interacting in different ways, such as an ecosystem, may be 
seen as a complex system.  
An increase or a decrease of complexity, according to some reduction 
context, may be associated with the observation of a novel property, but this 
does not mean that the presence of complex behavior is a sufficient condition 
for emergence9. However, complexity needs to be included somehow as a 
necessary condition for emergence. A first reason is that whether some 
property is emergent does not simply depend on how new it is observed. If it 
was so, noticing a crack on a wall for the first time would be enough to call it 
an emergent state. Of course, according to certain sets of conditions, a crack 
on the wall may be taken as an emergent property, but the novelty of this 
property should be correlated with the increasing complexity of the system 
seen from a general context and should not simply depend on the 
observational context. This means that complexity contributes to a richer 
                                                 
8 The account of Karen Crowther (2015) defines emergence in terms of synchronic 
novelty. A different analysis is offered by Alexandre Guay and Olivier Sartenaer 
(2016), who analyze emergence on the basis of diachronic novelty.  
9 As established in condition 2.2.3, there must be an abrupt change of complexity. How 
abrupt should it be? Well, it must be sufficiently abrupt to cause novelty, i.e. the 
appearance of a new property. 
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understanding of diachronic novelty. A mere change of states in a system is 
not enough for emergence. 
A second reason to include complexity in the analysis of emergence is the 
fact that it introduces a further asymmetry besides the temporal asymmetry 
already associated with diachronic novelty. While diachronic novelty is a 
feature that may depend only on the appearance of a system’s high-level 
properties, changes in complexity may depend just on the system’s low-level 
interactions10. The key point about condition 2.2.3 is that high-level novelty 
should be related to low-level changes of complexity. Of course, low-level 
changes of this kind also imply novelty, according to the definition given 
above.  
The notion of emergence just proposed is non-trivial in the sense that there 
are clear conditions according to which a given property is not emergent. It 
allows for the detection of emergence in everyday situations and also in more 
rigorous contexts, as should be clear later. In the following section, three cases 
of emergence will be described considering the definition proposed in this 
work. 
 
 
3 Examples of emergence  
 
The cases of emergence that will be considered in this section correspond to 
three different areas. The first is a case from thermodynamics, the second 
one is a case from biology and the third is from the philosophy of mind. For 
each example, I will simply offer one possible way of treating it as a case of 
emergence. Here is the first case:  
3.1 Phase transition. Suppose that the high-level state of a system changes 
from a liquid state l to a gaseous state, g. The system is constituted by a 
huge number of interacting molecules. We may want to say that state g 
emerges from those constituents. 
 
Let t and t' be two periods of time, such that t' is later than t. Let K be the 
context in which the following emergence claim is being assessed: State gt' (g 
at t') is emergent from the molecular micro-level state mt. Let K1, K2 and K3 
be subcontexts of K. The emergence claim is true if and only if the following 
conditions hold:  
 
3.1.1 Contextual reducibility. According to K1, the state gt' (g at t') can be 
                                                 
10 Consider, for instance, algorithmic complexity, which is defined in terms of the length 
of the shortest binary description of the system in question (cf. Kolmogorov 1965; 
Chaitin 1969). Essentially, it’s all about the parts. However, there are other measures of 
complexity, based on the description of regularities and thus involving a higher order 
characterization (cf. Gell-Mann & Lloyd 2003).  
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reduced to the molecular state mt', given certain laws, conditions and 
reformulations. 
 
In the case of contextual reducibility, we can use the notion of reduction as 
theoretical replacement. Such a replacement might be justified by observed 
correlations between gt' and mt'. In this case, reduction might be acceptable 
even if there is synchronic novelty between gt' and mt'.  
 
3.1.2 Contextual irreducibility. According to K2, gt' cannot be reduced 
to mt’. 
 
This might be the case if there is not enough information within K2 to establish 
relevant correlations between gt' and mt'. Another possibility is that gt' is 
considered as irreducible because another notion of reduction is the relevant 
one within K2. For instance, it may be that, according to a notion of reduction 
as derivation, gt' cannot be reduced to mt'.  
 
3.1.3 Novelty and complexity. According to K3, gt' involves properties that 
are neither involved in mt nor in mt' (synchronic and diachronic novelty)
11. 
Also, mt and mt' differ considerably regarding their complexity. 
 
Following the example of a phase transition, we could think of the forms of a 
gas cloud or its humidity as properties that are only part of gt'. These are 
emergent features of the system. There is also a considerable change of 
complexity between mt and mt', correlated with the observation of those 
relevant properties that are only present in mt'. The complexity of the system 
at the low-level while being in a transition from a liquid to a gaseous state is 
higher than its complexity while just being in a liquid state.  
Let us now consider a case from biology. An interesting feature of some 
species of bacteria, such as Pseudomonas aeruginosa, consists in the self-
organization of colonies in certain ways that allow the colonization of higher 
organisms. This ability is a high-level, collective property that arises only 
when a given threshold of cell concentration is exceeded (cf. Funqua, Parsek 
& Greenberg, 2001; Luisi, 2006), permitting an increase of intercellular 
signaling based on chemical interactions. This is a case of emergence that can 
be described in the following way: 
 
3.2 Bacteria. Consider a system constituted by individuals of the species 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa. Let c be a state of that system in which the group 
has the ability of colonizing higher organisms and t' be the time in which 
the system acquired that ability, such that ct' symbolizes the system having 
that ability at that point. Let bt describe some lower-level state of the 
                                                 
11 Depending on whether we focus on synchronic or diachronic novelty, we may define 
synchronic or diachronic emergence. 
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system, in which the cell concentration is increasing, and bt' a state of the 
system in which the cell concentration is considerably higher.  
 
The emergence claim that we would like to evaluate is this one: According to 
K, state ct' is emergent from bt. If this is true, we have to be sure that the 
required conditions hold, considering K1, K2 and K3, which are subcontexts 
of K:  
 
3.2.1 Contextual reduction. According to K1, ct' can be reduced to bt'.  
 
Here, we may think of supervenience. Ceteris paribus, changes with regard to 
the system’s ability to colonize higher organisms imply changes in the 
system’s cell density. 
 
3.2.2 Contextual irreducibility. According to K2, ct' cannot be reduced 
to bt'. 
 
Let us follow van Gulick’s (2001) notion of teleo-pragmatic equivalence, 
assuming that his notion of context can be captured by the epistemic notion 
of context involved in the present proposal. A description of ct' can be reduced 
to a description of bt' just in case every fact that can be represented by an agent 
S, using ct' within K2, according to a theory T1, can also be represented by S, 
using bt' within K2, according to T2. This does not seem to be true regarding 
the case considered here. We may, on the basis of the collective ability to 
colonize other organisms, represent potential interactions between a given 
population of bacteria and a particular organism. This representation would 
be much richer than a representation based merely on the system’s cellular 
density. 
 
3.2.1 Novelty and complexity. According to K3, ct' involves features that 
are neither involved in bt nor in bt'. Also, there is a considerable change of 
complexity between bt and bt'.  
 
The relevant new feature of the bacterial system is, following the description 
of the example, the ability to colonize higher organisms. Such a property is 
neither involved in bt nor in bt'. And the change of complexity is involved in 
the increasing intercellular signaling that results thanks to the high density of 
the population. 
Finally, we may focus on the case from the philosophy of mind:  
 
3.3 Phenomenal state. Suppose that Mary is observing a landscape and that 
her seeing can be considered as a set of phenomenal states. Let us call one 
of those particular states s. Mary’s state s is part of (or determined by) a 
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biological system constituted by neural states.  
 
This is the emergence claim that we want to evaluate: In K, state st' is 
emergent from neural state nt. As in the other cases, this is true just in case 
contextual reducibility, contextual irreducibility, novelty and complexity 
hold, where K1, K2 and K3 are accessible from K. 
 
3.3.1 Contextual reducibility. According to K1, state st' is reduced to nt.  
 
We have to consider a crucial point here. If every phenomenal state is a state 
of consciousness, i.e. a state of a system that essentially involves what it is 
like to be that system, then st' is not deducible from a system in which st' does 
not occur. In other words, the context in which a phenomenal state occurs is 
essential to it.  
In order to put the latter point in clearer terms, let Kp be the phenomenal 
context in which st' occurs. The reduction statement considered above could 
be reformulated like this: In K1, state st' according to Kp is reduced to nt 
according to K1.  
Since the acquaintance of state st' can only occur within Kp, it cannot be 
accessed from K1, unless Kp and K1 are the same context. Thus, the reduction 
of Mary’s phenomenal state could, in principle, only be carried out by Mary 
herself, observing the landscape and, simultaneously, carrying out a 
functional description of her experience. In other words, the scientific context 
(say, the neuroscientific context) must be identical with the 
phenomenological context.   
Of course, we could construct some functional description based on 
Mary’s behavior and what she reports while she admires the landscape and 
assume that such a description refers to her phenomenal state st'. We may call 
that description “st' according to K1”. However, “st' according to K1” cannot 
be identical with “st' according to Kp”. Thus, neither reduction as identity nor 
reduction as replacement could be carried out in this way successfully. A 
reduction based on derivation could also be carried out moving away from 
Kp. We could, in principle, derive “st' according to K1” from “nt' according to 
K1”. But that would not be a derivation of the phenomenal state st'as such.  
One could think that this way of considering reduction may be applied to 
any kind of emergent state. For example, we could say that a system’s gaseous 
state according to some context K1 cannot be reduced, from the perspective 
of a different context Km, to some molecular state of that system. This is true. 
But we could reduce the gaseous state described in K1 to the molecular state 
described in K1. And this reduction could be as valid as a reduction of the 
gaseous state described in Km to the molecular state described in Km. Neither 
the gaseous state nor the molecular state is essentially an epistemic state and 
neither of both is essential to a particular context. Both, K1 and Km, could be 
referring to the same thing. By contrast, phenomenal states are essentially 
epistemic states, in the sense that they must occur from the perspective of 
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some context12. More importantly, the context associated with a phenomenal 
state is only one, which means that a reduction of a phenomenal state 
according to a descriptive context K1 cannot refer to the same thing as a 
reduction of that phenomenal state according to a phenomenic context Kp. 
This shows in which way the contextual reducibility of phenomenal states is 
different from the reducibility of other emergent states. 
The irreducibility condition should not be hard to understand now:  
 
3.3.2 Contextual irreducibility. According to K2, st' cannot be reduced to 
nt'. 
 
This will be true whenever K2 is either different from the context that is 
essential to st'. Any attempt to reduce st' from a third person perspective should 
fail.  
According to the account proposed in this work, if Mary’s phenomenal 
state is emergent from the neural state nt, the conditions of novelty and 
complexity must also be satisfied:  
 
3.3.3 Novelty and complexity. According to K3, st' involves properties that 
are neither involved in nt nor in nt'. Also, there is a considerable change 
between the complexity of nt and the complexity of nt'. 
 
The novel properties involved in st' could be phenomenal qualities. They can 
only be found in phenomenal states. They are not like permeability, for 
instance, which is a quality that can be found in different kinds of states. The 
novelty of Mary’s phenomenal state is guaranteed, when one compares it with 
neural states nt and nt'.  
Regarding complexity, an activity change in Mary’s neural system 
occurring between nt and nt' might provide the appropriate information to 
satisfy this condition, if such a change is correlated in the right way with 
Mary’s phenomenal states. 
An interesting conclusion of these considerations is that, in principle, 
Mary’s phenomenal state can be rendered as an emergent state only from her 
perspective, because it can only be reduced from a context that includes the 
relevant phenomenal context of her experience. From any other context, her 
phenomenal states cannot be contextually emergent. At best, they could be 
re-described on the basis of Mary’s physiology or behavior and reduced as 
such. But, given the argument just presented, it is controversial to consider 
these descriptions as strong emergent states, i.e. states that cannot be reduced 
in any available subcontext, not even in principle (cf. Chalmers, 2006). Only 
phenomenal states, essential to a phenomenic context, seem to be 
                                                 
12 Here, I interpret the concept of epistemic state in a broad sense and not only limited 
to some kind of propositional attitude.  
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characterizable as strongly emergent. 
 
 
4 Other notion of contextual emergence 
 
Robert Bishop and Harald Atmanspacher (Bishop & Atmanspacher, 2006) 
propose a more constrained account of contextual emergence (see also 
Harbecke & Atmanspacher, 2011; Atmanspacher, 2015). I will explain its 
general aspects and then compare it briefly to my account.  
Bishop and Atmanspacher aim at establishing a clear interlevel relation 
between two levels of a system. It is based on two steps: 
 
4.1 Interlevel relation. A low-level L of a system is related to a high-level 
H of that system on the basis of the following steps. 
4.1.1 An individual description of L must be expressed as a statistical 
description of L. 
4.1.2 The statistical description of L must be expressed as an individual 
description of H. 
 
Take, for instance, a flock of birds showing interesting patterns. We can 
provide a low-level, individual description of the group of birds based on the 
states of each individual bird. By considering the probabilities of each bird’s 
possible state, we can construct a statistical description of the low level. This 
can be iterated in such a way that the collection of positions may form 
patterns, which are observable on the basis of step 4.1.2. Saying, for example, 
that the flock of birds has a round form is not a description of the low level, 
but an individual description of the system’s high level. The crucial point is 
that the conditions that allow us to identify the new individual aspects of the 
statistical description of L depend on the high level H (Atmanspacher 2015). 
This is a contextual constraint imposed by H on L. Such conditions can be 
seen as relevance conditions that determine interesting aspects of L. The 
features identified after performing step 4.1.2 are called emergent 
observables. Considering this, we can characterize the notion of an emergent 
property in the following way. 
 
4.2 Emergent property. A property P is an emergent property of a system 
just in case it can be observed on the basis of an individual description of 
the system’s high level, constructed from a statistical description of the 
system’s low level. 
 
There are more similarities than differences between the notion of contextual 
emergence put forward in this work and the one proposed by Bishop and 
Atmanspacher. First, both are epistemic notions of emergence. Emergence is 
understood in terms of epistemic contexts rather than as a relation that could 
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be assigned to sets of states independently of any context. Thus, these notions 
do not directly provide accounts of ontological emergence. I will consider 
this issue again in the following section.  
Second, both notions are defined structurally, in terms of relations between 
different domains. Emergent states cannot be defined considering only one 
level of description. One has to characterize them taking the different levels 
involved into account and explaining how they are related.  
Third, both notions of contextual emergence are based on some admittedly 
relevant notion of observation. Emergent states cannot be understood just 
descriptively but must also be conceived as phenomena. 
Let me now consider two main differences between both accounts. A first 
difference is that, according to the account of Bishop and Atmanspacher 
(2006), reduction is considered in a strict form, while my account is not 
restricted to any particular notion of reduction. They take the following 
concept: Some description E is reduced to another description B just in case 
B offers both necessary and sufficient conditions to derive E. I have nothing 
against the possibility of performing a strict reduction like this one within 
some reductive context, even if E could be defined as an emergent state at the 
level of a broader context. Actually, Bishop and Atmanspacher (2006, p. 
1757) argue that, in cases of contextual emergence, low-level descriptions 
might be necessary, but not sufficient for deriving high-level descriptions, 
because the contextual conditions are required. Thus, contextual emergence 
would imply some kind of contextual strict reduction, which we could 
characterize as follows: 
 
4.3 Contextual strict reduction. Some description of state E is strictly 
reducible to a description of state B just in case the description of B offers 
both necessary and sufficient conditions to derive the description of E, 
according to some reduction context K. 
 
We can see that, considering this characterization of reduction, the idea of 
emergence proposed in this work is in line with the account of Bishop and 
Atmanspacher, despite the difference just mentioned. 
Another difference between both accounts on contextual emergence is 
related to irreducibility. This is a feature to which Bishop and Atmanspacher 
do not pay much attention, because when there is a case of irreducibility, high-
level and low-level states seem to be completely disconnected. By contrast, I 
think that a contextual notion of irreducibility such as the one I assume is 
crucial to understand emergence. In particular, this sense of irreducibility is 
important to distinguish interesting causal features of the high-level state that 
are not explainable in the reductive context. Consider, for example, an 
economic crisis. We may be able to reduce the set of states that constitute the 
crisis to some set of states B, according to some reductive context mainly 
based on the interactions between economic agents. But we could also attend 
to the causal influence of the economic crisis in certain political issues. The 
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descriptions associated with such an influence might be considered from the 
vantage point of a different context, according to which the economic crisis 
is functionally irreducible. Of course, nothing precludes considering another 
reductive context in which those influences can also be reduced. However, 
even finding those cases we might also find a complementary context, 
according to which different causal features are rendered as irreducible.  
In regard to the account of Bishop and Atmanspacher, the importance of 
irreducibility contexts should be considered as a consequence of their notion 
of contextual reduction. For, if there is a context involving conditions that 
allow us to strictly reduce E to B, then there must be a context involving 
conditions that do not allow us to do that. Clearly, contexts of the latter sort 
are not always relevant, but only in cases in which they are, we might be able 
to identify emergent states, together with their irreducible causal roles. 
Downward causation is possible on the basis of irreducibility contexts, as 
when we say that the economic crisis caused a firm’s bankruptcy without 
giving a low-level explanation of such an effect. This way of understanding 
the problem of downward causation is similar to the perspective on mental 
causation proposed by Harbecke and Atmanspacher (2011)13.  
It may seem clear that the differences just considered do not imply deep 
contrasts, but actually express, under the right assumptions, interesting 
compatibilities between both accounts of contextual emergence. 
 
 
5 Ontological emergence 
 
As already mentioned, the notion of emergence proposed in this work is an 
epistemic notion and not an ontological notion of emergence, i.e, it is 
characterized on the basis of how we approach phenomena and seek 
knowledge about them rather than on how things are with independence of 
our understanding and knowledge. Now, what does it mean that something is 
independent from our knowledge? I am not going to answer this question 
here, of course, but it is problematic enough to justify introducing the 
following characterizations in hope of some clarity.  
 
5.1 Ontological state. A state s is an ontological state just in case for any 
set of epistemic states e, s would not change if e changed.  
 
Ontology is concerned with the study of ontological states. The notion of an 
ontological state refers to reality in general. I would not deny that there are 
ontological states. However, we have to distinguish between ontological 
                                                 
13 
Other differences between both accounts are related to the notions of observation, 
complexity, normativity, novelty and, particularly, to the stepwise characterization of 
the interlevel relation proposed by Bishop and Atmanspacher. I will not elaborate on 
these differences here. 
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states and descriptions referring to ontological states. We can characterize 
these type of descriptions as follows: 
 
5.2 Description of ontological state. A proposition describes an 
ontological state s just in case it attributes properties to s. 
 
An ontological or metaphysical notion is a notion that depends on how we 
describe ontological states. If we talk, e.g., about an ontological notion of 
subatomic particle, we claim that there are ontological states of a certain kind 
that have certain properties. The attribution of these properties cannot be 
something that occurs with independence of what we know or of our 
epistemic capacities. And if we acknowledge this, we have reasons to focus 
on some epistemic contexts rather than others.  
I propose that any ontological notion of emergence should be defined 
considering how we describe ontological states. I cannot deny that there might 
be ontological states of emergence, i.e. states to which we may refer on the 
basis of epistemic contexts that may not vary with variations of those 
contexts. In that sense, ontological states of emergence would be independent 
from our knowledge, just as any other ontological state. However, it seems 
more than plausible to think that any ontological concept of emergence must 
depend on what we know, as any other describable concept.  
The main idea of this section is to show how one may consider claims 
evaluated from particular contexts and accommodate them to determine 
whether a property is emergent in the ontological sense. This should be 
appropriate if we are disposed to accept that ontological notions and 
assumptions are not independent from our epistemic capacities. I will not 
focus on the details of any complete ontological analysis of emergence in 
particular. My aim in this section is rather to consider how ontological 
emergence and contextual emergence might be related. 
Warren Shrader (2010, p. 287) identifies a set of necessary conditions for 
an ontological account of emergence, which he calls minimal ontological 
emergence. These are the following: 
 
5.3 Minimal ontological emergence. Let SE be some set of properties and 
SP be the set of all physical properties. If E, a member of SE, is an emergent 
property, then the following conditions must hold. 
5.3.1 E is not ontologically reducible to any member of SP. 
5.3.2 Instantiations of E are determined either by a member of SP or are 
connected by a chain of determination to the instantiation of another 
member of SE that is determined by an instantiation of a member of SP. 
5.3.3 Some instances of E have causal features that no physical event has. 
 
Let us start considering condition 5.3.1. According to Shrader, a widely 
accepted notion of ontological reduction among proponents of ontological 
emergence is identity. A property Y is ontologically reducible to a property X, 
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if and only if Y is identical to X. Thus, being irreducible, emergent properties 
are not just physical properties. This notion of reduction is stronger than the 
notion of functional reduction characterized before (2.5). Although I focused 
on functional reduction, there can be cases of emergence, such that, according 
to a reductive context, a particular emergent property is identical to some set 
of physical properties. Additionally, according to another context, such 
emergent property would be functionally irreducible to that set of physical 
properties and, therefore, would not be identical to it. On the basis of the 
account presented here we may also consider other notions of ontological 
reduction, such as elimination (2.6), composition (2.8) and supervenience 
(2.9). Anyhow, contextual reduction does not express what condition 5.3.1 
expresses. Note that on the basis of a contextual notion of emergence, 
emergent properties must be reducible. And as mentioned, reducibility is 
considered in a general sense, including representational and ontological 
notions. By contrast, on the basis of minimal ontological emergence, 
emergent properties are just not reducible.  
Plausibly, ontological notions depend on what is assumed, presupposed or 
concluded within epistemic contexts14. For instance, I assume that there is a 
(real!) hill near me because I am seeing it. And I can conceive my seeing it as 
a process that occurs with relation to an epistemic context. I am used to trust 
contexts of visual perception on the basis of my experience with 
communication and action. Given that we can evaluate contexts in this way, 
suppose that we are able to consider, for any subject matter M, a most reliable 
epistemic context focused on it, symbolized as K*M., on the basis of which 
we may postulate our best ontology15. Although this kind of context may be 
based on the empirical results of a scientific community, empirical 
information is not the only relevant sort of information within it. We may 
characterize the notion of ontological reduction as follows: 
 
5.4 Context-based ontological reduction. A property Y is ontologically 
reduced to a property X just in case Y is identical to X according to K*X. 
 
I do not intend to replace the standard ontological notion of reduction as 
identity. Plausibly, if two ontological properties are identical, we can reduce 
one to the other. However, we have to consider that the notion of identity 
itself could be put under evaluation within K*X, as well as the properties 
according to which X and Y are described. Thus, whatever notion of identity 
is relevant at a given point according to some highly reliable context, property 
                                                 
14 
I am thinking of something near the well-known notion of ontological commitment 
(Quine, 1948; Atmanspacher & Kronz, 1999).  
15 
If there are two or more equally reliable contexts about the same topic, we may try to 
break the indifference by focusing on the broader context in which they are being 
assessed. Although crucial, the detailed issues related to context selection are beyond 
the scope of this work.  
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identity implies property reduction for that context, i.e. ontological reduction. 
This definition is close to what we may call a context-independent notion 
of reduction, even if, rigorously speaking, it is not. It implies that properties 
that are emergent in some epistemic sense may not be emergent in an 
ontological sense. Note that ontological reduction is projected from a more 
reliable context regarding X and not regarding the reduced property Y16. 
Let us now focus on condition 5.3.2. According to Shrader (2010, p. 289), 
any determination relation must be an asymmetric dependence relation:  
 
5.5 Determination. For any couple of entities X and Y, if X determines Y, 
then 
5.5.1 Y depends on X and 
5.5.2 the dependence of Y on X is stronger than the dependence of X on Y. 
 
Functional reduction, as defined before, can be seen as related to some kind 
of determination between states, when X and Y (or the causal roles of their 
instantiations) are not identical. Determination, as just characterized, is 
necessarily an asymmetric relation, while functional reduction is not. I will 
not discuss here other notions of determination and reduction, according to 
which the latter statements may not hold.  
Clearly, contextual reducibility is not enough to express condition 5.3.2. 
Let us put it this way, focusing on states rather than properties17: 
 
5.6 Context-based ontological determination of emergent states. Any 
emergent state E must be, within the most reliable context K*E, 
5.6.1 functionally reducible, but not identical, to some set of physical states 
or 
5.6.2 connected to other properties that are reducible in that way.  
 
Let us now focus on condition 5.3.3. It establishes that some instances of 
emergent properties have causal features that no physical property has. In 
order to characterize this idea, we have to recur to the ordering of contexts: 
 
5.7 Context-based ontological irreducibility. A state E is ontologically 
irreducible just in case there is at least one context K that is accessible from 
the most reliable epistemic context K*E, such that, according to K, E is 
functionally irreducible to the set of physical states that determine E, 
                                                 
16 One may object that whether something is ontologically emergent should depend on 
something objective and not be projected from our epistemic assumptions. As a quick 
response, I would say that scientists project ontologies all the time and not subjectively, 
but intersubjectively. What is a subatomic particle? It is whatever our best scientific 
context says it is. Objectivity, in this sense, does not mean independence from theory, 
but a kind of epistemic validity about what we have. 
17 The characterization regarding states can be translated to a characterization regarding 
properties, following 2.4.   
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according to K*E.  
 
These conditions may seem too strict. However, considering that it is 
ontological, and not just epistemic irreducibility, it seems acceptable to 
demand this much. So, ontological reducibility of states will imply, in a strict 
sense, that E must be reducible in all contexts that are accessible from K*E. 
By contrast, according to the present proposal, epistemic reducibility only 
implies that reduction is possible in at least one accessible context. 
Note that this version of ontological irreducibility is not the opposite of 
ontological reduction, as defined in 5.4. Following Shrader, ontological 
reduction is a thesis about properties, while ontological irreducibility is a 
thesis about states. Let K be a subcontext of K*E and let E be some state. It is 
possible that, according to K*E and to a notion of reduction as identity, some 
property involved in E is ontologically reduced (in terms of identity) but, 
according to K, E is functionally irreducible. This would imply that E is 
ontologically irreducible according to K*E. E would not be emergent in 
Shrader’s sense, but could be considered emergent in an epistemic sense, 
following the analysis proposed in this work. On this basis, ontological 
emergence is a special case of epistemic, contextual emergence. 
 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
 
Contextual emergence has been presented here as a non-trivial, epistemic 
concept of emergence. Challenges related to the apparent inconsistency of 
emergence can be tackled on the basis of this account. Additionally, it is 
compatible with an ontological notion of emergence, according to which one 
may project determined ontologies from particularly rigorous contexts. It has 
also been shown in which sense reduction and irreducibility are aspects that 
are as relevant for a broad account of contextual emergence as for an 
ontological account. 
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